The voice of B.C.'s organized fishing industry workers
GUEST COLUMN
In defence of the treaty: It meets Canadian goals'
• To encourage the best possible debate on the proposed Canada-U.S. salmon interception agreement. The Fisherman has invited chief Canadian negotiator Mike Shepard to present his case in favor of the treaty. This is the first of a two-part series.
By Dr. MIKE SHEPARD
IN dollar value, about 20 percent of the salmon caught annually by Canadian fishermen and about 20 percent of the salmon caught by United States fishermen in southeast Alaska and Washington consist of salmon bound for the rivers of the other country. These "interceptions" present two serious management problems.
First, without an agreement, there is no way for one country to insist that the other country co-operate to cut back fisheries on intercepted stocks when a conservation problem develops; the home country essentially bears the full burden of cutbacks to preserve the stocks (e.g. Canada's 1980 problems of protecting Fraser River chinook and Nass River sockeye runs).
Second, because it does not make economic sense for a country to build enhancement facilities that largely benefit intercepting fisheries in the other country, a number of promising projects on both sides of the line have been shelved. Such discouragement of enhancement benefits no one.
Canada has additional concerns. First, under the present Fraser Treaty, Canada cannot manage the Fraser River sockeye and pink stocks and must share with the United States any enhancement of these runs on a 50:50 basis in the Fraser Convention Area. The Fraser is a Canadian river, maintained through sacrifices of the Canadian people. Continuation of a regime of shared management authority and 50:50 sharing just does not fit into today's scheme of things.
Second, Canada receives virtually no benefits from production of salmon rivers which arise in Canadian territory and flow to the sea through the United States (primarily northern rivers such as the Taku, Stikine and Yukon). United States fishermen are the primary beneficiaries of these runs and Canada has only limited opportunities to fish them in the rivers.
Third, Canada perceives that the United States has the upper hand in interceptions and that Canada's citizens (who must foot the bill for protection of local runs) are therefore subsidizing United States fishermen. Some in the United States feel the opposite. Both sides are determined to get the facts right and on the basis of the facts, to develop programs to maintain an equal balance of benefits.
From the Canadian point of view, the objectives of an agreement are: better conservation, encouragement and not discouragement of enhancement, "repatriation" of the Fraser, benefits from transboundary rivers, and equity in interceptions.
The United States shares Canadian objectives with respect to conservation and enhancement and acknowledges the need for equity. It has special objectives as well, particularly with respect to development of coastwide coordination of chinook and coho management, and the need to avoid undue disruption of historic fisheries when implementing any agreement.
For the Fraser, the negotiators are proposing a formula which would transfer management authority for sockeye and pinks from the present salmon commission to Canada; Canada would conduct all research, set escapement targets and build all enhancement facilities on the river. Canadian fishermen would reap all benefits of future enhancement beyond the levels of production occurring during 1971-74 (the base period of the overall agreement). ThiH would be
Geoff Meggs photos
• Readying for a Fraser River fishery: Canadian chief negotiator Mike Shepard argues the proposed interception agreement will lead to better seasons for our fishermen.
whichever is less. This is less than the approximately 40 percent United States fishermen took during 1971-1974.
For pink salmon, during the early years of the agreement United States fisbermen would be permitted to take 33.6 percent of the total catch (the percentage they took in 1971-1974). Thereafter they would be limited to 2.1 million (their average catch in 1971-1974) or 33.6 percent, whichever is less. This formula once more would provide Canadian fishermen with the full benefits of enhancement.
The concept of the United States getting a share of the total catch, wherever caught, rather than a fixed percentage of the catch in the Convention Area (as the present Fraser Convention provides) gives some people trouble. There are sound reasons for taking this approach. When enhancement boosts production beyond present levels. United States fishermen will be limited by the numbers of salmon caught and it could not matter less where Canadians take the remainder of the catch.
When the runs are low and the United States fishermen are limited by percentages, a formula along the old line presents problems. Under the existing Fraser River Salmon Convention, there is a premium for Canada to take Fraser-bound sockeye and pinks outside the Convention Area because such salmon do not have to be shared 50:50 with the United States. This situation stimulates development of Canadian fisheries on Fraser stocks further and further away from the river where Fraser fish are often mixed with other, often weaker Canadian stocks. This can and does create management problems.
The existence of such artificial incentives to bad management are not in the best interest of Canadian fishermen and should not, I believe, be part of a new agreement; runs should be managed as a whole and not on the basis of whether or not they are fished on one side or another of a boundary line unrelated to the distribution of the stocks. Decisions on how and where Canadian fisheries take place should be made by Canadian administrators working with Canadian fishermen on the basis of what will produce more fish rather than on the dictates of an outmoded sharing formula which threatens sound conservation.
In the next edition of The Fisherman, I will discuss the other issues, particularly transboundary stocks, the question of what we know about interception balances and the negotiators' approach to the "equity" problem.
• Canning salmon in Prince Rupert: Can the agreement return more salmon to northern rivers to create jobs on the Skeena?
achieved by limiting the United States catch of sockeye and pinks to levels existing during 1971-74.
As enhancement came on line, therefore, with United States catches frozen, Canadians would reap all the excess production over the 1971-74 levels. The formula provides for some adjustments, at least in the early years of the agreement: when runs were weak. United States fishermen would take less than the 1971-74 entitlement and would he repaid in later years when the runs were enhanced. The basic entitlement of United States fishermen would be 2.24 million sockeye (their average catch during 1971-1974) or 35 percen t of the total catch of Fraser sockeye, wherever caught,
Letters
How herring affect salmon
Editor, The Fisherman:
The letter from the lady who wrote concerning the herring-salmon food chain (Why industry is on its back, The Fisherman, Sept. 26) is proof that a little knowledge is worse than total ignorance. She ties in the fluctuation of Bristol Bay salmon runs to the herring roe fishery in B.C.
Bristol Bay is noted for a large run of sockeye and pink salmon. These two, along with chum salmon, make up about 75 percent of our B.C. salmon pack in an average year. These three species are plankton feeders and don't even have teeth until just prior to maturity, so they never eat herring at any time in their life cycle.
The sudden increase in Bristol Bay returns is due to the Japanese agreement to move the boundary for offshore fishing about 1,000 miles west.
Statistical evidence shows the decline of Bristol Bay sockeye and B.C. chums began in the mid 1950s as the Japanese began to gear up after the Second World War. In 1980, B.C. is having good chum returns from a poor 1976 seeding, more circumstantial evidence that the offshore fishery was taking some of our chums. We seem to have some co-operation from the Japanese now, but a new threat is looming as South Korea begins to step up her operation without any treaty.
Closer to home, we had to stand helplessly by in 1980 as the "high seas fleets" of southeast Alaska — atNoyes Island and so on — took virtually the whole Skeena River run. The Alaskan catch of 900,000 sockeye was three times the Canadian catch. A senior fisheries biologist told me the maximum rearing capacity of southeast Alaska would be 40,000 to 60,000 fish.
It seems obvious to me the Alaskans are trying to establish what is called a historic fishery on Skeena River stocks. They will then use it to unfair advantage in the Canada-U.S.A. salmon treaty negotiations. It's about time Canada began to show some guts and demanded an end to this high seas piracy.
As far as the herring stocks are concerned, no one could argue with the suggestion that there has been some serious overfishing in the roe operation. However, there are a few bright spots. One of the biggest stocks, in the Strait of Georgia, is in the best shapeit has been since the reduction fishery began. Nonetheless, the spring and coho streams your letter writer is worried about get very low returns. I guess you can't hatch salmon from herring eggs after all.
RAY PHILLIPS
Madeira Park
Thanks to friends of Anker Gilstead
Editor, The Fisherman:
I would like, through you, to extend our thanks to all at Fishermen's Hall for the many kindnesses and solicitude extended to us following the death of my husband Anker on Oct. 3. We deeply appreciate the helpfulness of all the union staff in our arrangements to hold the memorial services in the building where he worked and where so many people he knew could gather. We're grateful to the Seniors' Club for their assistance that day and to Homer Stevens for conducting the service and eulogy so movingly.
FRANCES GILSTEAD, SUSAN GILSTEAD DOWELL and ERIC GILSTEAD
Vancouver
• The Fisherman welcomes letters to the editor, asking only that they carry the signature and address of the writer. Opinions expressed are those of the writers; they do not necessarily reflect and may in fact be opposed to the views of The Fisherman and the UFAWU. The Fisherman reserues the right to edit letters to meet space requirements.
THE FISHERMAN — NOVEMBER 7, 1980/5