• SEINERS MEET in Port Hardy on July 22 after fleet sailed from Area 8 refusing to fish for 15 cent pinks.
Unity is key to better contract
Nothing but unity and organization has stopped the raw economic power of the fish companies
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JOHN RADQSEVIC
UFAWU Secretary-Treasurer
EGOTIATIONS for the 1992 salmon contract in reality began prior to this year's herring negotiations. Rob Morley, chief bargainer for the major fish companies, told fishermen early this year that the companies intended to scrap the union salmon agreements and replace them with an Alaskan style "trust" relationship.
Their proposal would theoretically have allowed us to share all market advantages and disadvantages. In truth, it would simply have been a direct transfer of the risk of doing business, from businessmen to fishermen.
The union warned Morley that any such upside down reversal of roles between capital and its fishermen employees would hit strong resistance. Union members on fish boats already accept enough risks, depending so heavily on the size of the catch.
Morley's reply was that the companies intended to get their way "no matter what it took." Looking at what happened in herring negotiations and heading into this year's salmon negotiations, there was little reason to believe that the companies would fail to force some redefinition and restructuring of salmon pricing along the same lines as the herring contract.
Despite voting over 90 percent to strike, union herring fishermen finally chose to fish rather than allow others to deliver all the available quota into company hands. Fully half of the seine fleet and even more of the gill-net fleet were prepared to fish during a strike. Even past allies such as the Native Brotherhood of B.C. threatened to "fish no matter what." That is why it was impossible to achieve more on the herring price agreement.
It would be foolish to underestimate how serious the companies were at the start of salmon negotiations about ultra-low posted prices. They wanted 15 cent a pound pinks and $1.10 a pound sockeye. They wanted 60 percent boat shares. They wanted to throw out the competitive pricing clause.
Despite some sacrifices in the new contract, we should remember that it could have been much worse. The companies' main agenda was soundly defeated.
It makes little sense to accept any unfair fish price. It makes even less sense to strike if non-union fishermen are capable of delivering most, if not all, available fish into company hands. If salmon is delivered and the companies are economically insulated from
strike action, then the main purpose of a strike is defeated.
With this in mind, the UFAWU planned a series of job actions to effect the companies economically without actually triggering a full scale strike. In general, this summer's longer term, lower intensity struggle worked.
Fishermen, shoreworkers and ten-dermen co-operated very well in making the companies hurt in the pocket-book. Plants were shut down on a rotating basis by shoreworkers. Deliveries of seine and gillnet production dropped markedly as the fleet expressed its anger in various and often spontaneous ways.
The companies in the meantime had unilaterally cancelled the existing salmon price agreement and imposed posted prices. Even medical and dental benefits were threatened. The companies' message by fax to the UFAWU was 'call us when you're ready to sign on company terms or don't bother.' Obviously, more pressure was needed to force the compa-
of fishermen on the floats. The tie-up was extended first to 24 hours, then to the whole week. By the end of the first week there was no seine fish in the plants. Gillnetters had spontaneously begun a boycott of some companies. The Fish Processors' Bargaining Association was calling on the union for a return to bargaining. The protest was working.
Negotiations began almost immediately and some headway was made. But then things began to slow down once again. The main reason was that the companies began to realize that we were failing to convert on-the-grounds unity between fishermen to at-the-table unity between the executives of the union and the Native Brotherhood.
This became even more clear at a meeting between the two organizations when the Native Brotherhood, led by their president Bob Clifton and their executive director Jim White, formally rejected the union's appeal to join as equals at the bargaining table.
"It wasn't until the fleet, including vessel owners, native fishermen, union and non-union fishermen refused to fish the second week that negotiations got back on track"
nies to begin negotiating in good faith. The union officers suggested a protest tie-up. It was important for fishermen to have an opportunity to fight back.
There were no assurances that the tactic would work. Union seiners in the Prince Rupert area, where some reasonably good catches were being reported, voted against a tie-up at July 16 membership meeting.
On the other hand, seiners at meetings in Namu were much warmer to the proposal. The Namu fishery was scheduled to open 12 hours earlier than more northern fisheries.
In the hopes that Namu fishers could set an example which others would be willing to follow, the union's officers called for a tie-up over a coastwide radio conference. It was Saturday, July 18. Radio channels on the fishing grounds were alive as vessel owners, native fishermen and union fishermen debated what to do. It was that night that the fleet sailed in and tied up.
We can only speculate what might have been the outcome of salmon price negotiations if the tactic hadn't worked. But what happened is now a matter for the history books. United, union and non-union fishers took their destinies into their own hands.
The tie-up was extended by fishermen themselves, decided at meetings
This was particularly disappointing because the co-operative atmosphere leading up to the meeting held some promise that a co-operative effort at the bargaining table might be possible. It is also in sharp contrast to the Fishing Vessel Owners' Association which sent a representative to sit in on negotiations.
Shortly after rejecting the union's offer to bargain jointly, the Native Brotherhood signed a mysterious deal, the details of which neither the Brotherhood or the companies would divulge. The only information about the deal that the union had access to was contained in a press release declaring there was a new "trust relationship" between the Native Brotherhood and the fish companies. No fish prices were mentioned.
The deal was obviously not worth much. It wasn't until the fleet, including vessel owners, native fishermen, union and non-union fishermen refused to fish the second week that negotiations got back on track.
Better unity could have produced more. Nothing but unity and organization has ever been able to resist the raw economic power of the fishing companies and 1992 was proof of that.
While the companies were grossly exaggerating the economic downside,
THE
in truth, pink markets were troubled. The union's own research showed this. That's why from the start of negotiations, the union's negotiators warned that some flexibility may be needed on pinks.
Alaskan pink prices have slipped back to the low price levels of 1991. We don't want Alaskan conditions to dictate our situation, given that Alaskan fishermen are not organized. But we cannot simply pretend the large volumes and low prices in Alaska don't have some effect on pink
markets.
In the final analysis, the union negotiation committee concluded that some cuts to pink and chum prices were probably unavoidable and that the risks of maintaining the protest tie-up were too great, especially with the growing number of breakaways.
Fishermen will recall the 1975 tie-up, another year of bargaining when the runs of salmon were small. In that year a five week union tie-up produced a lot of scabs but little else in the way of economic returns to fishermen. It was a lesson the committee chose not to ignore.
This year fishermen got a real taste of what unity can do. But that unity was beginning to break down. We achieved what we could in under the circumstances.
It's time now to recognize what we were able to do and to begin to organize for the next round. Only the same degree of unity will likely work to preserve future incomes.
The results of the final acceptance vote (63 percent) showed that most fishermen agreed with the committee's recommendations and reasoning, despite some very legitimate disappointments in the contract.
SALMON PRICE CONTRACT
Species 1992 1993
$/lb. $/lb.
Sockeye $1.40 $1.33
Pinks $0.25 $0.25
Large red
springs $1.35 $1.35
Chums
—dark $0.15 $0.15
—bright $0.35
(Areas 1-10) $0.35
—bright $0.60
(other areas) $0.60
Coho $0.65 $0.65
Jacks $0.75 $0.75
• 7/11 crew share agreement to remain
• No change to benefit package
• Competitive price clause to remain with some compromise.
FISHERMAN / AUGUST 24, 1992 • 7
