6—THE BULLETIN—Thursday, Morch 25/ 1976
first of a series
By Prof. N. Safrtan
BROOKINGS PLAN ALLOWS FOR '
OF A NEW SIT OF RELATIONS
Prof essor Nodav Saf ran of Harvard University rocently eoncludod a six-wook visit to      Middle East, which took him to Dqmascus, Amman, Cairo os well as Isrqel, where he held extensive discussions with top officials> politicians, jntisllectuals. He wqs a member of the study group that produced the recently
publislied Middle Eosi^ Wqsh!ngt6fi-base(d Iro
focdijpqint of his discuss^^
THQ BROOKINGS PLAN is tKe
collective product of a studly group; and is therefore susceptible to diverse interpretations^ and emphases by the authors themselves. The document reflects a covergence of^conclusions which the individual participants reach-, ed through their own, not necessarily identical^ reasoning.
Ccmsequently, ' the description-of the plan and its underlying^ logic that follow and that I presented to my interlocutors in the Bfiddle East should be viewed as my own versions, not ccmimit-ing my colleagues.
The plan essentially enidsages the conclusion of peace treaties between Israel  and  the Arab parties involving a 'controlled' trade off of all the territories -occupied by Israel in 1967 (except Jor Jerusalem which is subject Jto a special treatment) fpr nor-jhaiized,- neighborly relations with tiie Arab parties^ not a mere ^''c^d" piBace. -
y tT*e^^<H»tr<>l is achieved by^
,breakJbig up Uie concept of nor- r malizied relations into specific
.components  and relating "Batches" of them to successive stages: ^
^f.withdrawal.
■iiPliOCRESSrra return of the territories by Israel is thus .^accompanied and cmditioned by ^ -actual advances on the Arab side ^toward normalizatimofrelations,
so that by; the tinie Israel has to pull back from the last occupied positions, virtually normal relations will have been already an established experience, not just a promise. '
to order ta encourage the parties, to reach such an agreement and aidhere to it, and as a fjirthei^; assurance for the future, the UidtedStates; the Soviet Union, and possibly other powers would conclude with til^ parties willing to do so, bilateral and multilateral. security and coo^^
As CeU* ais I am'-^^ the principal conceptual contiibution of the plan is that it gets behind the particular expressiras of the positions of the parties to tfa& substances underlying these positions, and formulates new ways in which these can be reconciled.
to other words, it restates the equation in terms that no longer" make' it. tosoluble. except by the total imposition of one aide's will cm the other^s;  ; .
'-AS PBESENTLY.ejqpressedi the Arabs' demand for the recovery of all- the territories they lost to. .1967 clashes -irreconcilably . with Israelf s insistence on retato-ing some of these territories for security .reasons. iBy switching the focus of Israel's seqOritj^. need from territory to the *c6h^ trolled' creation of a new set of relations: with its neighbor.
ttte*^ plan makes it possible, -in priinciple at least, for eachpai^ to meet the other's basic concern: wittiout doing violence to its own.
IN THE.CONTEXT of this conception, the Palestinian questitm, which has been made to seem^ so totractable of-late, falls much < more readily toto place.
For some time now, there has been agreement between Israel and the Arab parties that a viable Middle East setUement must give reasonable ^satisfaction to the national^ aspirations; of the Pale-stitiians. The argument has been ovi^r the question of how . auid throu^ whom this, is to be achijeved.
.Israel has insisted so far that these aspirations must find satis-^: faction only in the context of a-' Jordan-Palestinian state, whereas., tiie Arab parties favor, the creation of an todependent Pale- -stinian state. to the West Bank and Gaza. ^ .
Consequentiy   with . its yiirst \ potot, Israel has tosisted,that . Jordan is thfe only valid interlocutor on the future ' of ,the . Palestinian-inhabited terri-^ todes,  whereas- all  the Arab \t ^countries have recognized the 'PLC as the only spokesman for the^ Palestinians, even4hbugh the ^ formal. aim, of the - PLC goes
far beyond a state to the West Biankvand Giza.
koWv IF^ assume that the same prtociples. will apply to the West Bank and Gaza as will apply to the Stoai and;the Golan H^hts, then the question of a Palestinian or Jordano-Pale-stinian state, as well as the question of the valid toterlocutor should become matters of s^ecbnd-ary importance,    j 1/^^^^^^^^^ ^
Stoce the'Israeli withdrawlil ITrom file areas to question would take place, to stages^^and would be xontingent iQ>on the 'actual' gradual establishment of relations of peace and good neighborhood, it should matter littte to Israel who^ assumes such commitments and'what form develops to express
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PROF. SAFRAN
the Palestinian national aspira-tions.'
- The'questicns of antodependent state or a Jordano-Palestinian state, of Jordan or the PLC, tostead of being antihese? making for^ deadlock, become, in^&ct, alternative options that could . facilitate the diplomacy of applying the plan.
This, to me. at least, iis the logic behind the position tkk^n to the Brookings document, which : asserted the need to meet the Palestinians' national aspirations and the security concerns of both Israel and Jordan, but left open all the options for achieving tl^se objectives.
- Wim REGARD to Jerusalem,
it did not prove possible to get behtod the stated -positions of the parties io their underlying substances stoce both £pre mainly emotional.
Therefore, the reportcould only potot oat the possibiUty that the positton^^tjnight soften once ^ree-ment is^ reached on all other t issues, and. indicate a faw substantive conditicms which; though not sufiicient in themselves to constitute a fundation for a parti-.cular solution, must be part of any settlement.
These ccmditions 'are: custo-dianship of the holy places by .the respective faiths, no barrier to movement, throughout the city, and a .substantial measure of ■'■ -    political autonomy to the natiohal groups that desire it. to ^discussing the role ,of the • v V    supeipowers. to' relatioii to the plan, the report potots out that the United States has a vital toterest to promqting' a settte-' ', . ment, that ills emtoentl^qiial^ied
to do 80} and that, ,to doing soj it must be prepared to assume serious obligations such as providing large-scale aid and security guarantees as desired and needed.
As for the Soviet Union, the report e3q[»ressess<Hne uncertato-ty abouflhe extent to which it might be prepared to work for a general settlement, but nevertheless stresses the need to test its totentions. thoroughly by actively seeking to associate it to preparing and conducting negotiations and to contributing to suiiport their outcome.
FOR MYSELF, I. am con-siderabty more hopeful about the prospects of obtaining Soviet cooperation, if this is actiVety and totelligentty sought.
The doubts about the Soviets' toterest to a general setttement echoed to the report stem from a well known hypothesis that such a settiement is apt to terminate or drasticalty reduce their use-futoess to the Arabs and thus indermtoe their position to the
Now, one of the merits of the proposed plan, to my judgment is that because its ^application would r^uire j a • \sub^.tantial number of years, the support and cooperation of tiie Soviets would continue to be needed by the Arabs, and indeed by Israel, too, against the possibility of honest differences or bad faith by the other side.
This should give the Soviets the chance to be useful and influential to a more constructive and less risky context than that of a conttouing simmering conflict, which their experience has shown to be difficult to control.
AS FOR THE United States, I believe that its toterest to a setUement such as the one under discussion is even greater than is todicated to the report^ for reasons I will touch upon later: ' and I also believe that a firm American secuVity commitment to Israel will prove more neces-saiy for overcoming Israeli apprehensions and putting the plan across . than the report allows.
Israeli demurrals on the subject to the past were made to: order to forestall the notion of an American guarantee being advancedras a substitute for security resting on territory; but, if Israel Js to'make the conceptual adjust-, flient of seeking security to:the controlled establishment of new sets of relations, it would undoubtedly require' the added assurance
.of an American security treaty.
\ THbel Combination of a more urgent'ccmcieption of the American -toterest to a "warm" peace ^and a stronjger c(mviction that Israel would require a firni'American security pact to order to go'flie
. way of the proposed plan lead me to think that such a pact must be seen as an essential,^ totegral part of the package rather than a possible addition to it -
IF WE CONCEIVE of an American-Israeli security pact-as a necessary part of the plan, then we mustalso address the question of the effect of such a pact bi;i the. position of otsier toterested 'parties^'' -'^'-j'-P'^-'''
Authoritative Ariab spokesmen have ^licitty e^qpressed their (Cdnttoued on Page 12)' See^ BROOKIKfJS PLAN