6-THE BULLETJN-Thursday, February 2, 1978
Continued from page 2] our decisive victories on Uie battlefield.
The legend of Dif Yassin helped us in particular in the saving of Tiberias and the conquest of Haifa.
On June 29, 1946, British forces in Palestine, under the command of General Barker, arrested thousands of Jews, among them the heads of the official Jewish institutions and leaders of the Hagana. The building of the Jewish Agency was occupied and its files confiscated. Containing much secret information, the files were taken to the British HQ, housed in a wing of the King David hotel.
AFTER JUNE 29 large sections of the people had been thrown into confusion. Barker's blow had been very severe. Defeatism raised its deathly head. People, began to question our ability to fight the British regime.
Many expressed their despair as to the outcome of any "struggle": "Who are we, Nvhat is our strength, that we should be able to stand up to the British Army?"
These questions were pregnant with danger. They reflected the defeatism that is fatal to every war of liberation. We realized that Jewish self-confidence could be restored only by a successful counter-attack in reply to Barker's heavy blows.
We were therefore greatly relieved by the request of the Hagana (to proceed with an attack on the King David) and plunged with enthusiasm into a re-examination of every detail of the operation.
Giddy's tremendous inventive and creative powers were called upon to the full. (Giddy was the code-name of the Irgun chief of operations.) Innocent milk-cans became the bearers of high explosives. Their action was doubly assured. One mechanism determined: the time of explosion, half-an-hour after the cans were left in position; the other secured the cans against any attempt at removal or dismantling.
Next we considered how to giv^ the wah nings so as to eliminate casujdties^ iPira^^ keep passere-by away from the building, we decided to let off a small cracker-bomb, noisy but harmless.
Then we chose three offices to receive a telephoned warning, which would be given as soon as our men had got away from the basement of the hotel. These three were the King David hotel management, the "Palestine Post," and the French Consulate-General, which is close to the hotel.
Finally, warning placards would be placed next to the milk-cans ■— **Mines. Do not touch" — in case British experts should attempt to dismantle the explosives after our telephoned warning had been sent out.
The assault unit, under the command of the Jerusalemite Gideon (dressed in the flowing robes of an hotel worker), executed the attack with great bravery and carried out their orders with absolute punctiliousness.
They brought the milk-cans as far as the approach to the hotel. They then divided into two groups, one for the **break-through" and the other to "cover" the first.
The first group took the milk-cahs into the basement by way of the Regence cafe. They overwhelmed the cafe employees and locked them in a sideroom. These 15 Arabs presented no surprise to our men: the peaceful subjection of the cooks and waiters the only persons in the cafe at the time — \^as part of the plan. But our men were surprised by the sudden appearance of two British soldiers who, their suspicions being aroused, drew their revolvers.
A CLASH was unavoidable. Both sides suffered casualties. Meanwhile, the covering group outside had clashed with the British military patrols. In view of the nature of the operation, our men had no machine-guns, and had to fight with sten-guns and revolvers. However, the break-through party reached its bbj^tive. The commander of the operation himself set the time mechanism at thirty minutes and put up the warning placards.
The Arab workers were then freed and ordered to run for their lives. They did not hesitate. The last man out was Gideon, who shouted, "Get away, the hotel is about to blow up." ;
At the moment the warning cracker-bomb; was exploded outside the hotel and under cover of its smoke, our men withdrew. The noise caused by the bomb and the unexpected shootinjg drove away all passers-by in the streets.
At ten minutes past twelve, Gideon reached the spot at which our "telephonist" was waiting. She immediately telephoned the King David hotel and warned them that explosives had been placed uiider the hotel and would go off within a short time.
"Evacuate the whole building!" she cried to the hotel telephone operator.
She then telephoned the office of the "Palestine Post" and announced — as was later testified by the ''Palestine Post" telephonist that "bombs have been placed in Uie King^David hotel and the people there have been told to evacuate the building."
The third and final warning was given to the Frenches accompaimed by advice to open th^cdii^ulate windows 1^0 as to prevent the effects of the blast. The consulate officials subsequently confirmed the receipt of the warning. They opened their windows wide, and the French Consulate biiilding suffered no
ORTHODOX MEMBER of Irgun Zvai Leumi on guard in Jeruss lem.
IT WAS NOW twelve-fifteen. Gideon wa^ counting the minut^s^ So far, everything had gone aaiording to plan, e^^ the casualties we had suffered in the unexpected clash. The milk-cans were lodged in the basement under the government wing of the
All warnings haid been delivered and received. Thie^Fitish had no doubt begun the evacuation and, if things had gone as before in similar circiimstahces, would very soon complete it. Only one question bothered him: would the explosives go off? Might not some error have been made in the mechanism? Would the building really go up? Would the documents be destroyeii?
Each hiinute seemed like a day. Twelve-thirty-one, thirty-two. Zero hour drew near. Gidepii ^ew restless. The half-hour was alni<»tup... .Suddenly, the whole town seemed to shudder. There had been no mistake. The force of the explosion was greater than had been expected.
Yitshak Sadeh, of the Hagana, had doubted whether it wbuld reach the third or even the second floor. Giddy had claimed that, though only about 500 lbs. of explosives — a compound of TNT and gelignite — had been put into the milk-cans, the confined space of the basement would heighten the force of the escaping gases, and the explosion would reach the roof.
The milk-cans "reached" the whole height of the building, from basement to roof, sLx storeys of stone, concrete and steel. As the BBC put it, the entire wing of a huge building was cut off as with a knife.
But while our assault unit in the lion's den had ddne eveiything possible to ensure the timely evacuation of the hotel, others had taken a different line.
FOR SOME REASON, the hotel was not evacuated, even though from the moment when the warnings had been received there was p|lenty of time for every living soul to saunter out.
Instead, the toll of lives was terrible. More
SHAJTERfiD SOUTH WING of King David hotel in Jerusalem^ jstruck by IrGun Zvai Leiimi on July 22, 1946.
than 200 people were killed or injured. Among the victims were high British officers.
We particularly mourned the alien civilians whom we had no wish to hurt, and the 15 Jewish civilians, among them good friends, who had so tragically fallen.
Our satisfaction at the success of the great operation was bitterly marred. Again we went through days of pain and nights of sorrow for the blood that need not have been shed.
Why was the King David hotel not evacuated? In this tragic chapter there are certain facts which are beyond all doubt. There is no doubt that the warnings reached their appointed recipients. The "Middle East Mail/^ the BHtisK Fcttiies iiewspl^^^ the Middle East, reported that at several minutes past twelve the telephone operator in the hotel heard the voice of a woman warning her that bombs had been^ placed in the hotel, which should be evacuated without delay.
The telephone operator at the "Palestine Post" testified on oath to a police officer that at twelve-fifteen she received the warning and "at once" passed it on to flie duty officer at police headquarters. -
"Eshnab," the semi-legal organ of the Hagana, published the statement of a reliable witness who was in the hotel at the time of the explosion.
He said: "When I heard the noise caused by the warning explosion, I decided it was best to get out of the hotel. Many others tried to do so, too, but the soldiers barred any exit by shooting in the direction of the people trying to getxnit."
I subsequently learned that when the warning to evacuate the hotel reached a high official he exclaimed: ^*We are not here to take orders from the Jews. We give them orders."
In the twenty-five or twenty-seven minutes which, as testified to by all witnesses, had elapsed from the receipt of the warnings to the moment of the explosion, the authorities had ample time in which to evacuate every person in the hotel.
Finally, there is reason to believe that a specific order was given by someone in authority, that the warning to leive the hotel should be ignored.
Why was this stupid order given? Who was responsible for it? :
With the gathering of the evidence and the revelations of the Hagana inforniation service, it was widely suggested that a high o^ ficiai had deliberately prevented the evacuation of the King David hotfil in order, for some reason best known to himself, thata major disaster should occur. V
After weighing the matter during the years tiiat have passed, I am convinced that this th^ry IS contrary to the facts known to us, and is not true. •,    ^ ^
The question of the ancient Roman jurists, qui prodest? (whom did it profit?) does not provide the key to the mystery.
The question remams open.
,        * JCNS