Page 8 ^ The'Canadian Jewish News, Thursday, August 16, 1984
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Until the events of the past few weeks one might have thought that the hij^king of passenger airplanes was a phenomenon of the turbulent 1970s. : With the two aborted hijacking attempts in Central America and in Iran the picture is becoming more clear. What was once thought to be a passing thing has now re-emerged to terrorize the worlds airiin€ passengers.
There are a number of conclusions that one must be prepared to draw from the scandalous hijackings of July and August;
The first, of course, is that security is still unbelievably lax on some of the international carriers. When Arab-speaking thugs took over the Air France Fraiikfurt to Paris flight recently they were able to do so with an arsenal of weapons they had somehow taken aboard.
This is an unfortunate occurrence inasmuch as Air France is the same carrier that was diverted to Entebl5e1n 1976 in the wake of a similar takeover of the aircraft.
It is mystifying how the recent hijackings could have occurred in the light of all the electronic machinery now available to detect unwanted objects from entering airplanes.
International air travelers deserve better protection than what they are being given in the present instances. If this requires new monitoring devices then steps should be taken to instal them.
Since thelate 1960s no El Al plane hasbeen hijacked. And not for lack of attempts on the part of those who wish to do Israel harm.
The reason forlsrael's success in deterring would-be hijackers is simple. The airline takes no chances when the safety of its passengers is at stake.
A good lesson for the world's- other airlines.
The venerable Stratford, Orit. theatre company is offering Shakespeare's The Merchantof Venice again this season.
William Shakespeare was undoubtedly the English-speaking wOrld's greatest writer and dramatist; Wherd Jews are concerned, however, he was a literary merchant of mialice.
His portraiture of Shylock is a malignantly • brilliant one. The famous passage in which the latter utters the famous "Hath not a Jew eyes v ." is one of the finest pleas for tolerance in literature:.
Yet The Merchant of Venice Is a tricky medium through which to teach respect for men of different religions. Its caricatured depiction of a Jewish moneylender, however subtly nuanced, is ultimately a negative one.
It is impossible to measure the mischief wrought against Jews over the centuries by Shakespeare's manifest literary talent. It is . not accidental, however, that the Merchant was afavorite play in Nazi Germany.
Our distaste for Shakespeare's exaggerated portrait of ShylOck comes not merely from the Words of the play but from the nearly four centuries of Jewish experience in EurOpe which followed it and which ended with the Holocaust. -
It may be possible for Gentiles and even some Jews to watch The Mereiiant of Venice as dispassionate spectators at a first-rate dramatic presentation.
For most Jews, however, sitting through a performance of the play is an agonizing experience, given the jfacts of modem Jewish history.
factors involved
SHELDON KIRSHNER
Lebanon,_as a viable nation state, has disintegrated before our eyes. With morbid fascination, observers have watched the gradual demise of a country once hailed as a model of ethnic and religious coexistence,
Itamar Rabiriovich, ah eminent Israeli scholar, has followed its decline. Like a physician diagnosing the ills of his patient, Rabinovich has probed deeply, reaching conclusions which help explain the Lebanese malaise.
In his new book. The War For Lebanon, 1970-1983 [GorneU University Press, i$19.9S], he examines Lebanon's body politic. He analyzes the causes of discord, the nature of Syrian and Israeli policies, Israel's complex relationship with the Christians, and the 1982 war. \, -      . .■ ■   ■ ■
Rabinovich. head of the Dayan Center and the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, is a detached analyst. This is at least one good reason why his book merits attention. In an age when propagandists and publicists are on the ascendancy, it is refreshing to read an analysis that is calm, collected and balanced.-
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Events in Lebanon during the period under review, he writeis, unfolded in four distinct stages: the collapse of the Lebanese political system between 1970 and 1975, the civil war of 1975-76, the Ungeiing crisis unUI 1982 and thelsraeli invasfon in the same year.
Rabinovich points out, however, that crises Were endemic to Lebanon prior to 1970. Indeed, the challenges to the status quo, as exemplified by the historic 1943 agreement on Moslem-Christian power-sharing, came mainly from three sources.
• Some Moslems rejected the 1943 pacti which gave the Christians a slight edge, as unrepresentative of Lebanon's population.
• Various ideologues, be they Arab nationalists or Communists, viewed the existing system as a barrier to the implementation of their ideas.
• External powers, ostensibly Syria and Egypt, sought to estabHsh influence in Lebanon.
Conflict in Lebanon also resolved around the four rival concepts of the Lebanese state,; the author claims.
These concepts, which have divided Lebanese in the 20th century, are: a small Christian Lebanon, a greater Christian Lebanon, a greater pluralistic Lebanon, and an Arab Lebanon,
A small Christian Lebanon existed at the suffrance of the Ottoman Empire. In the
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Israeli soldiers in action during the war in Lebanon — one of the subjects hi Itamar Rabinovich's new book^
1920s. 1930s and 1940s. Emile Edde, a prominent Maronite politician, called for its resurrection. -
When France lost its colonial position in Lebanon, the Lebanese devised a formula — the National Pact — for a pluralistic nation. During the 1975-76 civil war, certain Christians, notably Bashir Gemayel. opted for a smaller Christian Lebanon. After 1980, Gemayel talked in terms of a greater Christian Lebanon. His brother, Amin, presently promotes the idea of a pluralistic Lebanon,
The concept of an Arab Lebanon remains an attractive alternative to a minority of Lebanese Moslems. But it is doubtful whether they can achieve this goal without much bloodshed.
Rabinovich, in discussing Lebanon's drift toward open chaos, says that the years 1972-76 had an unsettling effect on the country.
The influence of Saudi Arabia and other Islamic oil producers grew, and a new sense of Arab and Moslem power took hold in Lebanon. Lebanese Moslems, glorying in Moslem assertiveness, asked themselves why they should continue to accept Christian hegemony.
The emergence of a relatively stable and effective regime in Syria, after years of instability, had an impact as well. Syria, which always regarded Lebanon as an extension of its own territory, formulated an ambitious foreign policy designed to bring it into its direct sphere of influence.
Syrian meddling, Rabinovich notes, radicalized the quiescent Shiite community and gave the Palestinians the chance to entrench themselves politically and militarily.
The Palestinian dimension, he observes, brought Lebanon to its knees. The presence of the PLO exacerbated Christian-Moslem relations and turned the heretofore weak Lebanese left into a formidable threat to the system. ' •     , ."■
Lebanon, unlike Jordan, was unable to meet the Palestinian challenge. The Lebanese did not have the advantages of a cohesive ruling elitCi a strong army, and unambiguous American and Israeli support.
With Lebanon crumbling day by day, Syria stepped in, —.
Syria's wily president, Hafez Assad, was determined to. prevent both Lebanon's partition and a clearcut victory by the Moslems over the Christians. Such a triumph, Rabinovich explains, would have sandwiched Syria between two radical states, one of which, Iraq, was a bitter enemy, and would have probably prompted IsraeH intervention.
Israeli involvement. He goes on to say, would have forced Syria into a quandary: to fight Israel or to suffer th,e humiliation of failing to do so. Syria chose a third course — military intervention.
In order to justify and legitimize its armec policy, Syria harped on the notion of a Greater Syria (which would include Lebanon, Jordan and Israel.)
Syria's thrust into Lebanon, in the summer of 1976, was decisive — paving the way for what was to be a half-baked settlement. Lebanon, in the wake of the 18-month-Olc civil war, was almost an empty shell. The authority of its president, government, parliament and central. bureaucracy was limited to parts of Beirut. And Lebanon's territory was split up among local militias, Syria and Israel.
Israel got involved in the Lebanese morass in the late 1960s. In staging preemptive and punitive raids against PLO bases, Israel reduced PLO pressure on its northern border but played into the hands of those who wanted to weaken Lebanon still farther and transform it into an entity far less acceptable to Israel.
According to Rabinovich, the collapse of Lebanon left Israel with three options: It could intervene on behalf of the Christians. It could acquiesce to a Syrian takeover. It could accept Syria's presence with limitations.
Israel opted for an informal arrangement with Syria, brokered by the U.S., under which Syria would not be permitted to dispatch troops south of the Litani River.
By 1980, Israel had a change of heart, Rabinovich says.
Israelnow edged closer to the Lebanese Front, the Maronite Christian umbrella group led by Bashir Gemayel, and decided to bring about Syria's departure from Lebanon.
Several developments contributed to Israel's attitude. Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman. the foreign and defence ministers under Menachem Begin who had urged caution, resigned. Meanwhile, Gen. Rafael Eitanv the hawkish chief of staff, gained influence.
The challenges posed by the Moslem Brotherhood to Hafez Assad's regime, combined with the Reagan administration's anti-Syrian line, emboldened Israel to act with vigor in Lebanon.
Israeli air force went into action against the PLO
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Finally, Bashir Gemayel had matured as a leader and had made his pro-Israel feelings known.
In the spring and summer of 1981, Rabinovich relates, Israel no longer felt bound by a policy of restraint. The missile crisis erupted, and the Israeli air force went into action against the PLO in southern Lebanon.
In both instances, Israel was surprised by the counter-reaction. Syria stood its ground, even after an Israeli ultimatum that its surface-to-air missiles in the Bekaa Valley had to be removed. And the heavy Israeli bombing of southern Lebanon proved to be ineffective and costly for Israel.
Less than one year later, Israel invaded, predicating its operation on the basis that it was unavoidable and could likely change the map of the Middle East.
The Israelis miscalculated, as we now know. So, too, were they wrong in believing that they could forge an intimate, inextricable link with the Christians of Lebanon.
the Christians, Rabinovich concludes, had grave reservations about such a relationship — a fact known to some Israelis — and were convinced that Israel could not be fully trusted as the Maronites' guarantor and savior.
Israel had doubts about the reliability of the Christians, but they were cast aside as war preparations began in late 1981. Israel, to its distress, was to learn that the Christians could not be depended on. And the Christians, to their regret, discovered that Israel would not shed needless blood for their cause.