Page 10-The Canadian Jewish News, Thursday, November 12, 1987
M-T
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Marrus touches on key questions
By
SHELDON KIRSHNER
In The Holocaust in History (Lester & Orpen Dennys, $22.95J, Michael Marrus has undertaken ;the important task of writing the first comprehensive assessment of the vast literature on the Holocaust.
The University of Toronto history professor, in a virtuoso intellectual performance, applies the tools of historical, sociological aind political analysis to understand this cataclysmic event.
Examining its central themes with a discerning eye, Marrus touches on such key questions as the evolvement of Nazi policy, the role of collaborationist governments^ the nature of public opinion in Nazi-occupied Elurope and of Jewish resistance, and the attitude to the Holocaust of neutral nations, the church and non-endangered Jewish communities.
Marrus points out that, until the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, there was "relatively linle discussion" by historians of the mass murder of European Jewry. "Broadly speaking, general works (of history) scarcely mentioned the murder of Eu^ -ropean Jews, or did so in passing as one more atrocity in a particularly crUel war."
Since then, of course, we've been inundated. "Indeed, the field is by now too va.st for any one scholar to ma.ster." he observes.
In his opening chapter. The HoltKaust in Per-sjjeciive, Marrus deals with a topic that is usually taken for granted — the importance of antj-semitism in Nazi policy before Hitler's accession to power in 1933.
Marrus, who is scheduled to. appear at the roronto Jewish Book Fair on Nov. 24, suggests thai anti-semitism was not necessarily "salient" prior to that watershed. Quoting scholar Sarah Gordon, he notes that, with several exceptions, surprisingly few of the top-ranking Nazi leaders were "virulent anti-semites." Although anti-semitism was clearly a "distinguishing feature" of the Nazi Party, there is no evidence that men like Goebbels, Himmler or Goering joined because.of it.
According loMarruSi Hitler was the "principal. driving forcfe" of Nazi anti-semitism, raising his intense hatred of Jews into "an affair of the state." '
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Looks at Armenians^ Jews
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"Hitler alone deflned the Jewish menace with the authority ... and ruthlessness needed to deflne its place for the party and later the (Third) Reich," he adds. "Put otherwise, anti-semitism in Germany may have been a necessary condition for the Holocaust j but it was not a sufficient one. In the eiid it was Hitler (who) made the difference."
Marrus deals with another intriguing point when he delineates the differences between the slaughter of Armenians by the Ottoman state and the murder of Jews by Nazi Germany.
The killing of the Armenians lacked the machine-like, bureaucratic,and regulated character of the Holocaust, and it was not inspired by ideological obsession. And, of course, the Turks did not single out every Armenian. The Nazis, by contrast, required the total disappiearance of the Jews. "In this respect," Marrus explains, "the fate of the Jews was unique."
Marrus is in agreement with those historians who contend that the decision to systematically eliminate the Jews was taken not before World War H, but in the second half of 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Up to thait juncture, he writes, the Nazis followed ^*an uneven path" vis-a-vis the Jewish probliem. Radicals were in favor of terrorizing jews wherever they were to be found. Conservatives preferred caution, wpiried that anti-Jewish actions might do harm to Germany's economic recovery and international: reputation.
Until 1941, Jewishemigration was the Nazis-long-term goal. But after invading the Soviet Union and eastern Poland, with their millions of Jews, Germany blocked all exits. By the mid autumn of that e^tful year, Marrus says, technical teams had begun work on the first two death camps, at Chelmno and Belzec. By November, the.Wannsee Coriferencrwas called. And by December, the gassing of Jews was Under way at! Chelmno.
In his chapter entitled The Final Solution, Mar-riis grapples with an issue that modern Holocaust
deniers have gleefully seized on — why is there no written record of Hitler's decision to exterminate European Jewry?
Hitler, he states, was, as a general rule, reluctant to commit himself to paper and always preferred to give orders orally. Authority in th& Third Reich flowed not from laws and orders, but from expressions of intent. Using Raul Hil-berg as a reference, Marrus says it is quite pos^ sible that a signed order from Hitler to kill the Jews may never have been issued. He disrhisses as fatuous David Irving's claim that Hitler, not having given such a written order, really knew nothing about their terrible fate.
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Differences in East^ West Europe
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In his chapter on collaborators, Marrus breaks down the differences between the Nazi,killing process in Eastern and Western Europe.!
In the East, where the Nazis were eminently powerful, they proceeded without restraint, partly because of the existence of so many Jews, and partly because of their perception of the Slavs as a lower form of humanity. In the West, where these conditions did not prevail, the Nazis were far moi-e careful in trying to conceal their final objectives from the surrounding population.
Local collaboration was part and parcel of the Nazi occupation of Western Europe^ particularly in France, but Marrus argues that even collaborators "began to drag their feet" when the Germans demanded the deportation of native, rather than foreign, Jews.
In Romania, for example, the fascist regime distinguished between the acculturated Jews of Old Romania and the largely unassimilated, non-Romanian-speaking Jews of Bukovina and Bessarabia. "In the end, most of the Romanian Jews were not deported,'- he says.
There is no doubt, he believes, that collaborationists, as well as official Gennan allies, exerted some efforts on behalf of native Jews and resisted demands to participate fully in the Holocaust.
"National pride, apprehension about public opinion at home, distaste for the Germans' killing program, and fear of Allied retribution all played a part in their recalcitrance."
Turning to the question of public opinion in Nazi Europe, Marriis ranges far and wide across the continent.
In Poland, for the most part, the Jewish c'ommunity "suffered alone." Drawing on the work of Walter Laqueur, Marrus concludes: "Compared with West European countries, the Poles showed less sympathy and solidarity with the Jews, But compared to some other East Europeans, their record is probably better." '.
Throughout Western Europe, the long tradition of anti-semitism stifled expressions of sympathy for Jews. However, the Nazis ruthlessly punished anyone suspected of providing assistance to Jews, thereby all but closing such humanitarian avenues.
In Holland, where the first public protest in Europe against Nazi Jewish policy took place, the Germans crushed the resistance and took other measures that drastically worsened the Jewish situation there.
Writing of Jewish resistance to the Nazis, Mamis criticizes the oft-repeated argument that the Jews went to their deaths meekly.
While it is true that resisters formed a "tiiiy minority," there are other factors to remember, he says. The Jews, though they lacked military training and experience and had no "supportive environment," nevertheless staged the first urban armed revolt against the Nazis — .the War-saw Ghetto uprising.
Relying on Yehuda Bauer's findings, Marrus identifies armed resistance to the Nazis in 24 ghettos in western and central Poland alone. And Jews there, he notes, established more than 30 partisan groups to combat their tormentors.
Lest we forget, Marrus reminds us that resistance groups frequently had to face the strong opposition of Jewish communal leaders."The7Mii<?«rare often did everything possible to undermine resistance networks. The Jewish pollcejracked them down; and they^^^ were denounced in the official Jewish press."
In Westerri Europe, at least until the summer of 1942, few Jews were aware of .what lay in'store for them._And as a result, Jewish resistance "lacked the suicidal desperation" ofJewish communities in the East.
Marrus discounts the theory that Jews outside
the Nazi danger zone easily grasped "the essence" of the Holocaust. And unlike some other writers, he does not condemn out of hand American Jews for their rather timid behavior in the face of the greatest Calamity ever to befall the Jewish people.
Michael Marrus
US. Jewry was divided, vulnerable and exposed to anti-semitism. And the Roosevelt administration, fighting a war on many fronts, did not really attempt to focus any meaningful attention on the rescue of Jews until late in the war.
As for Canadian Jews, they felt far more vulnerable even than their American co-religionists.
The Soviet Union does not emerge gloriously from Marrus' scrutiny. During the 1930s, Moscow officially rejected the idea of receiving Jewish refugees from Hitler —"the only great power to have taken an open, principled stand against doing so." , The Russians claimed that the refugees, predominantly middle class, were unsuited for life in their supposedly classless society, and that, the refugees' homelessne.ss, a function of the quarrels among capitalist states. Was not their responsibility.
Neutral nations — Switzeriand, Sweden. Turkey. Spain and Portugal — feared offending the . Germans and were therefore reluctant to get involved in the rescue effon on behalf of Jews. But once the tide turned against the Wehrmachl. after 1943, the neutrals adopted amorc flexible attitude.
The Roman Catholic church does not emerge unscathed: The Vatican, he.declares, took issue with Hitler and Mussolini on racial questions. But it "seldom opposed'! anti-Jewish persecutions and "rarely denounced" governments for discriminatory practices.
During the war. the Pope was well informed of the killings, but refused to issue "explicit denunciations."
The Holocaust in History is a first-class work of scholarship, a guide that will help readers through the shoals of an event that may never be understood in its entirety. Michael Marrus is to be commended for showing us the way through this dark labyrinth.
Seeks top Jewish Agency post
: ■ : -By J. J. GOLDBERG (The Jewish Week)
NEWYORK-
Jewish Agency treasurer Akiva Lewinsky finds himself in the centre of a storm these days, and he appears geiiuinely bewildered as to why (CJN Nov. 5). .
The Swiss-born kibbutz member. 69, was unanimously chosen by the Israel Labor Party last spring as its candidate for chairman of the Jewish Agency executive. But many Diaspora philanthropic leaders insist that the massive social service body needs a "new face" at the helm after a long winter of scandals under outgoing chairman Leon Dulzin.
"I don't always understand the opposition to me," Lewinsky said recently. "I hear they're looking for a new face. Until I was elected treasurer in 1978, I never dealt with the Jewish Agency. I was a banker. How does that make me part of the establishment? I think this whole affair shows how deep is the lack of understanding between our commu-nities."   ;,\        .;: ■■■
A former managing director of Bank Hapoa-lim, Lewinsky is legendary in Israel, for his methodical, by-the-book management style His refusal to compromise on procedure — "I never make deals and I never promise something I'm not going to deliver," he said — frequently has infuriated U.S. Jewish activists seeking rapid change in the Agency's activities.
Lewinsky's supporters acknowledge that his thoroughness can be frustrating, but they insist it should make him more attractive, not less so, to those seeking increased Jewish Agency accountability.
' 'The trouble is, the Americans are more concerned with style than with substance," said one young Labor Party figure connected to Lewinsky's campaign.
For many Diaspora activists, the issiie is simply their desire for a youthful leader who can provide inspiration and new direction to the agency.
"The hostility against Lewinsky is not and should not be personal," Milwaukee federation leader Alan Marcuvitz, a member of the Agency 's board of governors, told a correspondent. "I have worked with Lewinsky shirt-sleeves rolled up, and there is no more competent per-. son when it comes to handling financial affairs . . .if he is left alone."
According to.some young Labor actiyisfs. who have led Lewinsky's campaign from the beginning, his very age is a reason to back him. • "He's been following in the Ben-Gurion tradition of nurturing a young cadre of leadership and bringing them forward," said -Simmy Ziv-el, 31, North American representative of the United Kibbutz Movement and one of Lewinsky's; top strategists. "It's a classic case of the covenant
Akiva Lewinsky
between the grandparents and the grandchil-: dren."
Lewinsky's strongest backing, according to Ziv-el and other insiders, comes not from the Labor party establishment but from a group of young Jewish activists here and in Israel. , Their support is based in part on the likelihood that he will be a l-term chairman, opening the way in four years for a new generation of young activists. The name most frequently cited is Avra-ham Burg, 33, a New Israel Fund consultant who serves as aii advisor to Lewinsky and to Labor Party leader Shimon Peres.
In recent weeks, Lewinsky has circulated a po-, sition paper, outlining his own proposals for Agency reform among members of its board of governors. Many of his points — depoliticization of the Agency's Israeli leadership, more centralized management and increased openness to non-Orthodox Jewish religious trends — parallel the concerns of Diaspora philanthropies and reflect his own previously published views. . Full-time involvement by Diaspora lay leaders is a concept Lewinsky proposed last spring.
"When the President of the United States calls on one of these people tobserve a term as. say. postmaster-general or secretary of commerce, they consider it-an honor to drop their businesses and move to Washington for a few years to .serve their country," Lewinsky told The Jewish Week. "I'd like to see them regard service to the Jewish people with the same seriousness.''