Page ib-the Canadian Jewish News, Thursday. August 10, 1989
M-T
inion
Saudi air force, Syrian army stronger, better equipped
SHELDON KIRSHNER
The latest edition of The Middle East Military Balance (Westview Press, $55 U.S.), one of the finest reference books of its kind, deals with a range of issues that bear directly on Israel's strategic posture in the region. '
The volume is edited by Aharon Levran and Zeev Eyan, both of whom are associated \yith Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. It covers the years 1987 and 1988. Considering the lead time scholars require to compile and analyze data, another year will have to elapse before inforriiation about the current calendar year is published.
Discussed in depth in this edition are the air and nisival balance as well as the spectre of mts-sil6 warfare. Ground forces, the backbone pf any military organization; are mentioned largely in connection with Syria's buildup since the 1973 YomKippur War.
in his survey of the air forces of Israel and the Arab states, Leyran — a retired brigadier general who specialized in ihtelligence-gathering — concludes that Israel still holds a qualitative edge over the Arabs.
But he warns that, in future battles, *'some changes (can) be expected in comparison with past results." the kill ratio in dog Tights, for example, could change. The Israeli Air Force (lAF) would still come out ahead, butwduld suffer some downed aircraft. Arid enemy planes, he adds, would have a better chance of bombing targets deep inside Israel.
In his view, the most significant development affecting the lAF in the second half of the 1980s; wa.s Israel's decision to discontinue the Lavi project. Budgetary considerations, however, did not affect the program designed to enhance and extend the life of the F-4 Phantoin, the lAF's workhorse.
The major event in Syrian Air Force activity was the absorption of the MIG-29, comparable to the best American aircraft. The Syrian acqu-sition of the MIG 29, he writes, does not signify "an acute change" in the Israeli-Syrian aerial balance. But it does represent a "step forward" for Syria in advanced combat potential.
Turning to Iraq, whose war with Iran lasted eight years, Levran says that the Iraqis have "demonstrated a capacity for aeriaf reftielling, ground force support and "smart weapons" (such as laser-guided air-to-surface missiles.)
These developments should be a source of considerable concern to Israel. But, in Levran's opinion, Iraq would face a far more superior enemy in Israel. As he puts it: "For most of the Gulf War the Iranian Air Force offered virtually no resistance to the Iraqis, whereas the intensity (Of Israel's reaction) could well surprise and deter them, and would in fact very likely dissuade them..." ; Levran says that the acquisition by Saudi Ara-bia^of early-warning planes, surveillance aircraft and refuelling tankers gave it the ability to operate over long distances. And in this sense, the Saudi base at Tabuk, relatively dose to Israel, is no longer the sole threat posed by Saudi Arabia.
Developments in Egypt merit some attention. Although Egypt is at peace with Israel, the fact remains that Egypt might one day resurne its hostile attitude. The major event is that Egypt, having once been supplied almost exclusively by the Soviet Union, has Westernized its air force, Egypt, however, has failed to integrate its Western and iSoviet systems,; and until it does, it "will hot be able to realize the full potential of its weapon systerns."
In a chapter entitled *'The Growing Threat to Israel's Rear,'* Levran speculates that in a future war — agiednst Syria in particular Israeli rear areas that were inunune to Arab attack are liable to be hit by air, missile and perhaps chemical Weapons strikes.
Syria, in light of its possession of accurate SS-21 missiles, poses the principal threat, he explains. iTie Syrians, too, are developing chemical wailieads for their intennediate-range SCUD missiles. ■■
Levran reminds a reader that the Arabs have already deployed missiles against Israel During the Yom Kippur War, Syria fired Frog rockets at an Israeli air base north of Haifa, but they struck nearby settlements: Egypt, in the closing days af that war, fired SCUDS at Israel's bridgehead across the Suez Canal.
Naval warfare ui the Middle East hasalways been greatly overshadowed by ground and air combat and, until the 1973 Arabrlsraeli war, Mideast governments tookT^latively little notice of theu* respective navies.
In recent years, everything has changed. Three Arab navies — the Syirian, Saiidi iuid Libyan — have undergone a dramatk buildup.
the Syrians have accorded greater priority to their navy and coastal defences for several reasons. Their navy was trounced by Israel in 1973;
Thanks in part to the Kfir, Israel holds the balance of power in the air.
Arabian Sea
they seek pverall strategic parity with Israel; they've expanded their economic infrastructure on the coast; they realize that the unimpeded flow of Soviet weaponry via the sea requires a credible navy.
Syria, Levran says, has expanded its missile boat fleet and acquired submarines and tank-landing craft. Despite this, Levran writes, the Syrians have not acquired the capacity to carry out a highly complex seaborne landing.
According to Levran, the Saudi navy has made vast strides since 1982. By 1988, it had the potential to become the "dominant maritime presence" in both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf Libya's force grew,' but its navy faces supply and maintenance problems.
Israel's navy continues to enjoy a qualitative advantage over its Arab adversaries. It is the result of several factors, two of which include a higher level of manpower and maximum use of electronic systems.
Levrain claims that Israel's future navy will be based on corvette-size missile boats and advanced submarines. (Since publication of The Middle East Military Balance, Israel has apparently postponed the purchase of new German-built diesel-powered submarines.)
Levran says that the growing terrorist threat from the sea has compelled Israel to develop a high level of coastal and maritime detection systems.
He perceives a "pronounced decline" in Israel's capabilities in the Red Sea since its withdrawal from Sharm al-Sheikh at the tip of the Sinai Peninsula. "This reduction... would render it more difficult to open the Strait of Tiran, should it be blocked, and to engage in long-range missions both in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez."
In spjte of budgetary constraints, Israel's navy is capable of meeting successfully the challenge of the upgraded Arab navies, he concludes.
In an analysis of Syria's army, Levran observes that, despite cutbacks, it is "a formidable adversary" to Israel, particularly in defensive combat.
Syria's defensive capability is based on its network of fortifications on the Golan Heights and in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, coupled with its large contingent of forces and weaponry in Syria. He adds that Syria is capable of launching a "surprise offensive" on the Golan;
To appreciate these and other problems facing Israel, a reader would be advised to consult Tlie Middle East Military Balance. On the open market, there are few, if any, comparable works.
Advanced submarines will be part of Israel's navy hi the future. The sub shown here is an older model. [IPPA photo]